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Abstract 
We study the good- and bad-times performance of equity portfolios formed on 
characteristics. Many characteristics associated with good performance during bad times – value, 
profitability, small size, safety, and total volatility – also perform well during good times. Stocks 
with characteristics signifying high liquidity, such as high turnover and low bid ask spreads, 
perform well during bad times but otherwise underperform. We develop a simple but flexible 
procedure to recover a “risk neutral alpha” that recognizes a 1% return experienced during bad 
times as being more valuable than a 1% return generated during good times. We also show how 
an investor can build a “rainy day” portfolio that minimizes underperformance during bad times.   
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One of the organizing principles of modern asset pricing theory is that investors should pay 
higher prices for securities that pay handsomely in bad times. In the Consumption CAPM, for 
example, the price of a risky asset, pt, is determined by the future payoff xt+1, times the rate of time 
preference, θ, and the marginal utility of consumption in the period in which the asset pays off: 
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An equivalent formulation of this idea is that securities that perform well during bad times should 
earn low average returns.  
However appealing the idea encapsulated by equation (1) may be, it has been of limited 
use in explaining the pricing of individual stocks. The simplest measure of a security’s downside 
exposure – its CAPM β – has long been known to be insufficient to explain the cross-section of 
returns (Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Brennan (1971), Fama and French (1992)). Measures 
of downside risk based on consumption data have an even poorer record matching the data (Hanson 
and Singleton 1982, 1983; Parker 2003; Campbell and Cochrane 2000). Although some 
researchers have identified measures of downside exposure that correlate somewhat better with 
expected returns, the overall empirical success of the consumption CAPM for the cross-section of 
stocks has been limited.1  
The Consumption CAPM still, however, serves an important normative purpose: investors 
should avoid securities that pay off poorly in bad states of the world, and even more so if those 
securities do not handsomely reward investors during ordinary times. In this paper, we embrace 
                                                            
1 Researchers have had slight success when measuring the correlation of stocks with longer-term consumption growth. 
However, the resulting measures of bad times do not easily conform to conventional views of what an investor would 
call bad times (Parker 2001; Bansal and Yaron 2004; Parker and Julliard 2005; Malloy, Moskowitz, Vissing-Jorgensen 
2009 and many others). 
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this normative objective. We ask, for an equity investor who is worried about bad times in the 
future, what securities should she optimally hold?  And, if this investor holds stocks that are less 
exposed to bad times, how much performance drag can such an investor expect?  We answer these 
questions by adopting a two-state asset pricing model in which times are either good or bad. We 
show that adopting this simple approach recasts the performance of many well-known risk factors 
in a way that is useful for real-world investors. 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we must settle on a definition of bad times. The 
concept of bad times is highly model- and preference-dependent. We adopt the approach of 
classifying as bad times periods that would be classified as bad by nearly any sensible 
representation of the stochastic discount factor, and would likely be considered as difficult periods 
by most investors. Specifically, most of our analysis is performed using a measure that captures 
periods of extended stock market drawdown occurring simultaneously with poor economic data. 
According to our measure, bad times are quarters with yearly excess market return of minus 
nineteen percent, negative GDP and earnings growth, and high inflation and unemployment. While 
our two state approach is a simplification of a continuum of states, it is easy to implement because 
one does not have to calibrate a utility function. 
Second, we identify which types of stocks performed the best during bad times – 
professional investors sometimes refer to these stocks as “defensive equities.” We sort stocks into 
quintiles based on their total ex post returns during bad times, and measure the characteristics of 
the best performing quintile at the start of each bad times episode. A number of distinct patterns 
emerge. Defensive stocks score high on value, profitability, “safety”, are growing slowly, have 
low volatility and are highly liquid (high turnover and low bid ask spreads). These results only 
partly reflect the fact that some of these characteristics are associated with low CAPM betas.  
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 Third, guided by the results above, we build long-short portfolios based on characteristics 
so as to measure the discount or premium associated with performing well during bad times. For 
each of these portfolios, we measure its unconditional market beta, and its conditional good-times 
and bad-times alpha.  For example, the value factor HML has a CAPM beta of -0.06, a good-times 
alpha of 0.32% per month, and a bad times alpha of 1.09% per month.  Having both a positive bad-
times alpha and positive good-times alpha is suprising, but appears in many of the characteristics-
based portfolios that we study.  
How should an investor assess the state contingent bad times alpha achieved by these 
strategies? We propose a simple approach guided by the normative logic of the consumption 
CAPM and the pricing of the overall stock market. Namely, if the aggregate stock market is priced 
correctly on average, then we can back out the implicit value that investors place on achieving 
returns during good and bad times. We then use the implied state prices during good and bad states 
to evaluate the realized returns of our characteristic-sorted portfolios.  The difference between the 
state-price weighted returns across good and bad states yields each strategy’s “risk neutral alpha.” 
Our measure is akin to evaluating equity portfolio returns under the risk neutral measure. Our 
approach differs from the more standard CAPM alpha, which after controlling for beta, equally 
rewards performance in good and bad times. For example, the CAPM implicitly puts the same 
value on a loss in December 2008 and a loss in January 2004—both months in which the market 
was up by 2.2 percent.  
Our analysis yields the following conclusions. Portfolios based on liquidity measures 
outperform during bad times but underperform during good times, thus achieving risk neutral 
alphas close to zero. For the characteristics of value, and profitability, however, the risk neutral 
alphas are even higher than the CAPM alphas, reflecting that these strategies perform even better 
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during bad times than during good times. Finally, low-risk factors have bad-times alphas around 
zero, but since they have large good-times alphas they have positive and large risk neutral alphas. 
We combine these insights to construct a “rainy day portfolio” that is long stocks that perform well 
during bad times: those with high book-to-market, high profitability, and market capitalization 
below the median. The rainy day portfolio has an unconditional CAPM alpha of .8 percent per 
month and it has a bad times alpha of 2.3 percent per month.  
We don’t mean to suggest that our characteristics-based portfolios are the only ways that 
an investor can immunize herself against bad times. For example, the most well-known bad-time 
protection strategy is to buy out of the money puts on the market index. Applying our two-state 
methodology to the profits from this options-based strategy, we show that such a strategy has a 
positive good-times alpha and a negative bad times alpha, with a risk neutral alpha close to zero. 
This lends some confidence to our classification of good and bad times.  
In the last section, we describe a number of extensions and robustness tests. We show that 
industries can be easily classified according to their exposure to good and bad times; however, 
defensive industries tend to underperform slightly during good times—this effect is subtle as the 
correlation between good- and bad-times alpha is only -0.15. We show that the characteristics that 
we identify as being robust to bad times among US stocks (size, book-to-market, and profitability) 
have similar performance amongst international stocks as well. We also compute risk neutral 
alphas using different definitions of bad times and find that our results are largely robust across 
the different definitions.  
A large literature in asset pricing connects measures of risk to expected returns of 
individual stocks or portfolios. A common starting point for many of these papers is the 
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observation that the securities market line – the relationship between average returns and the 
CAPM beta – is too flat relative to CAPM theory. A number of papers have developed more 
nuanced risk measures to fit the cross-section of returns, starting with Chen, Roll, and Ross’s 
(1986) study of exposure to macroeconomic variables. Other studies include Ang, Chen, and Xing 
(2006) who analyze stocks’ downside beta, and Parker (2003), Parker and Julliard (2005), Malloy, 
Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009), and Yogo (2006) who study exposure to changes in 
consumption.2 Our normative approach departs from the approach taken in most of the literature, 
because we do not attempt to fit any particular asset pricing model.  
In Section I, we develop simple time-series measures of bad times. In Section II, we 
describe the ex-post characteristics of stocks that exhibited the best performance during bad times. 
Section III develops a simple procedure to risk adjust portfolio returns for their exposure to bad 
times and applies it to characteristic-sorted portfolios in US data 1963-2015. We also develop a 
“rainy day” portfolio built to minimize drawdowns in bad times. Section IV describes a number 
of extensions. Section V concludes.  
                                                            
2 For similar approaches, see also Jagannathan and Wang (1996); Heaton and Lucas (2000); Cochrane (1996); 
Vassalou (2003); Li, Vassalou, and Xing (2006); Ait-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004); Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad 
(2005); Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2006); Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) and 
Daniel and Titman (2012) offer a skeptical view on these approaches.  
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I. Identifying Bad Times 
Bad times are periods where investors place a high value on investment payoffs. Asset 
pricing has admitted several definitions of bad times, which depend on the specification of 
investors’ utility function. Intuitively, bad times may be when the economy is troubled and 
investors face a higher risk of job loss or reduced wages and have to reduce consumption as a 
result, or it may be when financial markets are troubled and investors have realized large financial 
losses. In the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, states of the world are fully summarized by the return on the 
aggregate financial wealth portfolio. Consumption based models suggest that bad times are periods 
where the economy is troubled, or aggregate consumption has fallen (Lucas (1978), Breeden 
(1979) Campbell and Cochrane (2000)). To encompass the largest class of theoretical models, our 
baseline measure of bad times is when the economy is experiencing both economic and financial 
bad times. 
 We define financial bad times as quarters in which either the quarterly or the yearly US 
stock market excess return is in the bottom quintile of our sample, which runs from 1963 to 2013. 
By evaluating yearly excess returns as well as shorter-term quarterly returns, we ensure that we 
identify as bad times periods when the market is in a large drawdown, even if there has been a 
partial recovery. Specifically, if the market drops dramatically in one quarter, and neither recovers 
nor worsens in the following quarter, then this following quarter is likely to be defined as financial 
bad times despite having neither high nor low returns itself.  
  To define economic bad times, we use the NBER business cycle indicator. We define a 
quarter to be economic bad times if at least one of its months is registered as a recession by the 
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NBER. Our resulting classification of quarters into economic bad times is similar if we instead use 
industrial production or annual real GDP growth and select the bottom quintile in the time series. 
We define the rainy day index as a quarterly dummy variable equal to one if the quarter 
has both economic and financial bad times and zero otherwise. While this restrictive definition 
may leave out some periods that would be admitted as a bad time under some specifications, our 
approach minimizes false positives. Figure 1 shows the time-series of the rainy day index.  
Table 1 reports sample average of different economic and financial variables under 
different definitions of bad times. The first column shows the economic and financial features of 
our entire sample, and the remaining columns show the averages during different definitions of 
bad times.  Rainy days are worse than normal times on nearly all dimensions: annualized excess 
market returns of minus nineteen percent, year-on-year GDP growth of minus one percent, 
earnings growth of minus twenty-five percent, higher than average inflation, higher than average 
unemployment, and a five percent yearly drop in home prices. Rainy days are also associated with 
a higher TED spread, a higher market volatility as proxied by the VIX, and more noise in the term 
structure as captured in Hu, Pan, and Wang’s (2013) term structure noise measure.3 Rainy days 
indeed appear to capture difficult times for almost any investor. Our rainy day index is strongly 
negatively correlated with growth of durable consumption, but uncorrelated with nondurable 
consumption. 
We noted that our measure of financial bad times includes some of the rebound period after 
a stock market crash, when the market is still down significantly from peak. Table 1 also describes 
                                                            
3 TED spreads, VIX, and the noise measure are not available for the complete time-series. 
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a measure of bad times called “drawdown” that excludes the rebound period.4 “Drawdown” bad 
times are quite similar to our baseline measure of financial bad times, however the market returns 
are somewhat lower.  
Finally, while most of our discussion will center on the performance of US stocks during 
bad times, as a robustness check, we also perform our analysis on a global sample of stocks from 
1986-2013. We construct a separate rainy day index for the global sample. We use the excess 
return to the global value-weighted market portfolio to construct our global financial bad times. 
We define global economic bad times as the periods where the growth in GDP for OECD countries 
is in the bottom quintile of the sample. As presented in Table 1, the features of the global rainy 
days are quite similar to the U.S. rainy days. Further, the correlation between the global rainy days 
and the U.S. rainy days is 0.82.  
II. Which Stocks Outperform during Bad Times? 
To identify rainy day stocks, we first sort stocks into portfolios based on their ex-post 
performance during rainy days. We then calculate the ex ante characteristics of the portfolios and 
look for relationship between characteristics and returns. 
We include the following characteristics in our analysis: market value, book-to-market, 
momentum, profitability, “growth”, “safety”, total volatility, turnover, modified Amihud ratio5, 
and the bid-ask spread. As our profitability, growth, and safety measures we use the composite 
                                                            
4 The column labelled “drawdown” considers all market drawdowns with peak below minus ten percent: bad times 
are defined as the period between the beginning and the maximum of the drawdown period. We set the maximum 
length of a drawdown to be five years.  
 
5 We estimate Amihud ratios as suggested by Amihud (2002) except that we base our measures on turnover rather 
than raw volume, so as not to mechanically confound liquidity with size. 
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variables defined by Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2014).6 We update accounting information 
each June using information from the end of December in the previous year. We update market 
capitalization at the end of each month. Our choice of characteristics is guided by prior research. 
Characteristics can loosely be grouped into those related to fundamentals (size, profitability, safety 
and total volatility, and growth), past price movements (momentum), and liquidity factors 
(Amihud ratios, turnover, and bid-ask spreads). Many of these characteristics are known to 
produce unconditional alphas, but this is not a prerequisite for inclusion. Our primary focus here 
is on when these alphas are produced. 
We group consecutive quarters of bad times into a total of seven periods (1969Q4-1970Q3; 
1973Q4-1975Q1; 1980Q4; 1981Q3-1982Q2; 1990Q3-Q4; 2001Q1-Q4; 2008Q1-2009Q2). For 
each of the seven periods, we sort the stocks into quintiles based on the ex post return over the full 
bad times period, where the breakpoints are based on the ex post return to NYSE firms. Within 
each quintile, we calculate the equal weighted ex ante characteristics of each portfolio. This 
procedure results in seven periods with five portfolios in each. Our final characteristics estimate 
for each of the five portfolios is the average across the seven periods.7 We measure characteristics 
as the cross-sectional percentile.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows these results. The best performing quintile of stocks 
disproportionately contains value, safety, low growth, low total volatility, high Amihud ratios (i.e., 
illiquid), and low turnover. These results reflect, at least in part, the fact that some of the 
characteristics we examine are correlated with CAPM betas. Thus, in Panel B we instead sort 
                                                            
6 We estimate the modified Amihud ratio, turnover, and bid-ask spreads using daily data over 90 days. We require at 
least 30 observations to construct the characteristic. Bid-ask spreads are closing spreads which are available on 
CRSP from 1982 for NASDAQ firms and 1992 for NYSE/AMEX firms.  
7 The time-series weights are the number of quarters each consecutive period of rainy days last.  
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stocks on CAPM alphas realized during bad times. For each period, we compute alphas as the 
cumulative excess return to the stock minus its ex ante beta times the cumulative excess return to 
the market. We estimate the betas in the same way as Frazzini and Pedersen (2014).8	Adjusting for 
market beta has the effect of reducing the overrepresentation of growth and total volatility among 
the groups of the best performing stocks. Adjusting for market beta also changes the conclusion 
about the liquidity characteristics, as the best performing stocks are now associated with high 
liquidity (high turnover and low bid ask spreads). Aside from that, the characteristics that perform 
well during bad times in Panel A seem to also be associated with CAPM alpha. 
While these results suggest that equity investors may be able to hedge against bad times by 
holdings stocks with particular characteristics, the results are ex post and thus do not provide much 
quantitative guidance as to how effectively an investor could protect himself against bad times ex 
ante, and the results do not offer insight into the price investors must pay during good times for 
this bad times protection. We present formal tests in the next section. 
III. Measuring the Performance of Rainy Day Stocks 
We now describe the returns of portfolios based on the characteristics in Section II. We 
follow Fama and French and construct our factors as the intersection of six value-weighted 
portfolios formed on size and the portfolio’s characteristic.9 The turnover factor, for instance, is 
                                                            
8 We shrink the estimated betas towards their cross-sectional mean, ߚመ௜ ൌ 	ݓ௜ߚመ௜் ௌ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݓ௜ሻߚ௑ௌ, with shrinkage factor 
ݓ௜ ൌ 0.6 and cross-sectional mean ߚ௑ௌ ൌ 1.Our estimates of betas are given by ߚመ௜் ௌ ൌ ߩො௜,௠ ఙෝ೔ఙෝ೘, where  ߪො௜ and ߪො௠ are 
the estimated volatilities of stock ݅ and the market and ߩො௜,௠ is their correlation. We use five-year rolling windows and 
overlapping three-day log returns, ݎ௜,௧ଷௗ ൌ ∑ lnሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ା௞௜ ሻଶ௞ୀ଴ , to estimate correlation. We use one-year rolling windows 
and one-day log returns to estimate volatilities. We require at least 750 trading days of non-missing return data to 
estimate correlation and 120 trading days of non-missing return data to estimate volatility.  
9 We use the size and momentum factors from Fama and French, the value factor from Asness and Frazzini (2013), 
and the safety, profitability, and growth factor from Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2013). 
‐‐11‐‐ 
 
long half a dollar in each of the two high turnover portfolios and short half a dollar in each of the 
two low turnover portfolios. We use conditional sorts for the portfolio breakpoints.  We follow the 
convention that the long side of the portfolio buys the stocks that have high unconditional CAPM 
alpha, which is not necessarily the same as having a high alpha during bad times. 
The first two rows of Panel A of Table 3 summarize average excess monthly returns during 
good and bad times. Value, profitability, safety, total volatility, and turnover-sorted portfolios 
outperform by more than 50 basis points per month during bad times, although the performance is 
only statistically significant in the case of value and profitability.  
As in Section II, the results on excess returns partially reflect differential exposure of these 
long short portfolios to the stock market. To control for this exposure, we regress portfolio excess 
returns ,eptr   on the aggregate stock market excess return and a bad times dummy: 
,e 1 ( )p m ft u b b t tr r r u        (2) 
Notice that we estimate a single beta in equation rather than separate good and bad times betas. 
The idea behind a constant beta is that it captures a simple market hedge achievable ex ante, even 
if bad times are not forecastable.10  
Equation (2) measures the conditional performance of an investor who shorts β units of the 
market as a hedge. The return this investor achieves during good times is estimated as αu, while 
the bad times performance is given by the sum αu+ αb. Panel B of Table 3 shows these results. 
Column (1) shows that the Fama-French SMB portfolio, that buys small stocks and sells short 
                                                            
10  If states are defined only by market returns, then the statement that a portfolio has a high bad times alpha is 
equivalent to saying that it has a higher downside beta. This no longer holds exactly when bad times are defined based 
on variables other than the market return. 
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large stocks, has a good times alpha of 0.18 percentage points per month, and a beta of 0.19. In 
addition, small stocks earn an additional 0.27 percentage points per month in alpha during bad 
times, thus totaling 0.45 percentage points per month. 
The value portfolio has a good times alpha of 0.32 percentage points per month, and a bad 
times alpha of 1.09 percentage points per month. Profitable stocks have a good times alpha of 0.25 
basis points per month, and a bad times total alpha of 0.43 percentage points. Growth stocks, 
however, outperform during good times but underperform during bad times. “Safe” and low 
volatility stocks outperform (on a beta adjusted basis) during good times, and underperform 
modestly during bad times. Momentum exhibits enormous outperformance during good times 
(0.89 percentage points per month) but underperforms during bad times. The various 
characteristics measuring illiquidity – Amihud, low turnover and high bid-ask – all outperform 
during good times but underperform during bad times.  
The main takeaway from this table is that for many characteristics that are associated with 
an unconditional alpha, this does not come at the expense of performance during bad times. 
Similarly, outperformance during bad times is not associated with any discount in good times. 
There are some characteristics, however, for which outperformance in bad times is associated with 
underperformance during good times. In particular, illiquid portfolios (high Amihud ratios, low 
turnover, high bid-ask spreads) all earn an alpha during good times, but pay for it with 
underperformance during bad times. Low turnover stocks, for example, achieve a good times alpha 
of 0.40 percentage points per month, but bad times performance is -0.22 percentage points per 
month. 
Computing Risk Adjusted Performance  
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Although our conditional bad times alpha estimates are revealing, their magnitude is 
difficult to evaluate without a benchmark of how much outperformance in bad times should be 
equated with underperformance in good times (or conversely).  For example, columns (5) and (7) 
show that safety and momentum underperform slightly during bad times, but on the other hand 
they experience large outperformance during good times.  
Consider the stochastic discount factor representation of asset prices. For any portfolio p 
that is correctly priced: 
,e0 pE mr       (3) 
in which and m denotes the stochastic discount factor, and ,epr  is the return to portfolio p net of 
the risk free rate. If there are only two states good (g) and bad (b), it then follows that: 
,e
,e .
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     (4) 
where s  denotes the probability of state s.  
 To go from a ratio of state prices to the level, we make use of the fact that 
 1/ (1 ) [ ] .f b b g gr E m m m      (5) 
This allows us to solve for state prices 
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We define the risk-neutral alpha for a portfolio p as 
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    (7) 
which is simply the return evaluated under the risk neutral measure. In Appendix 1 we show how 
for any partition of outcomes into S states, we can compute a risk neutral alpha for any portfolio 
p, provided we have expected returns on S-1 other non-redundant assets. 
 Equation (7) can be implemented conditionally or unconditionally. We implement it 
unconditionally and back out state prices using the average performance of the market during good 
and bad times, a procedure that resembles Hansen and Jaganathan (1991). We start by observing 
that in the data, bad times occur in 13.2% of quarters with an average market return during these 
months of -1.72%. We can then back out the state prices using equation (6) and the average 
performance of the market during good and bad times. Under our definition of bad times, the risk 
neutral alpha of any portfolio works out to be approximately 0.33 times its excess return in bad 
times (even though bad times only occur 13.2% of the time)  plus 0.67 times its excess returns in 
good times. 
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An attractive feature of this methodology is that the risk neutral alpha can be computed 
using state contingent excess returns, or using state contingent CAPM alphas, yielding an identical 
result. To see this, note that we can always write the excess return of portfolio p in state s as  
,excess ,ep m
s s sr r     (8) 
where β is the unconditional CAPM beta. But the risk neutral alpha of the market is zero, meaning 
we can use the alphas directly. The key to this is the use of the market as a reference portfolio for 
which the risk neutral alpha of zero is zero by assumption. 
More generally, our identification of the risk neutral alpha relies on three assumptions. 
First, our two states must correctly identify all states of the world. Second, the value of the 
stochastic discount factor in each of the two states must be constant over time. Third, the 
probabilities for the two states must be constant over time. The second and third assumptions imply 
that we can use realized market portfolio returns to back out state prices and state probabilities. 
None of these assumptions are likely to hold absolutely, but they are quite similar to those made 
when implementing an unconditional CAPM model.11 
Our definition of risk neutral alpha is tied to a particular interpretation of the term “alpha.” 
In the parlance of conventional asset pricing, if the CAPM embodies all risk, then alpha is 
orthogonalized by construction and there is no sense in which it needs to be “risk adjusted.” But 
most investors and economists control for market exposure in their assessment of performance not 
                                                            
11 The last assumption – that probabilities of good and bad states are constant – is probably the most problematic of 
these given the manner by which we construct our measure of bad times. Specifically, since the definition of bad times 
is based on the realization of the market portfolio in the previous period, the likelihood of ending up in a bad state is 
likely to vary over time. We note however that our drawdown measure of bad times is robust to this problem, as our 
drawdown measure uses the maximum drawdown to define the bad times. As we shall see later, our results are largely 
robust to using the drawdown definition of bad times. 
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because they believe this captures all risk in the portfolio, but because it is a step in the right 
direction.  
 
 Results: Risk neutral alphas of characteristics-sorted portfolios 
 The bottom rows of Table 3 show risk neutral alphas. Value, safety, total volatility, and 
momentum all have risk neutral alphas greater than 30 basis points per month. Characteristics 
measuring liquidity tend to have risk neutral alphas closer to zero. 
For value, the risk neutral alpha is statistically significant and higher than the unconditional 
alpha. This results it consistent with Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994). Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny who suggest that value stocks do not perform worse than growth stocks 
during bad times. While Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny are concerned with the driver of the 
value premium and emphasize that value stocks do not underperform during bad times, we 
emphasize that value stocks actually achieve most of their risk neutral alpha during bad times.  
Contrarily, Yogo (2006) finds that value stocks do indeed lose money in bad times as these 
stocks have high durable consumption betas. Since our bad times measure is correlated with 
durable consumption changes, our results seemingly differ from Yogo’s. One reason for this 
apparent disconnect is a subtle bias that arises in Yogo’s two-step GMM procedure. Namely, the 
correlation between consumption and stock returns is too low to reliably estimate consumption 
betas. Once this bias is corrected for, Bryzgalova (2015) shows that changes in durable 
consumption are not able to explain the value premium.12  
                                                            
12 Additionally, simply regressing changes in durable consumption on the returns to HML gives a negative, not 
positive, correlation, suggesting that, to a first order, HML is a hedge against consumption losses. 
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Illiquid stocks underperform during bad times and their risk neutral alphas are close to 
zero. These results are consistent with the pricing equation in (3) and with the theoretical results 
in Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Acharya and Pedersen’s model suggest that a negative shock to 
liquidity causes contemporaneously lower returns to illiquid stocks. Indeed, as documented in 
Table 2, bad times are periods of high illiquidity, and the negative bad times alphas of the 
illiquidity factors are thus in line with Acharya and Pedersen’s results. 
 The low risk factors have positive risk neutral alphas, but they have bad-times alphas close 
to zero. These results are potentially consistent with a leverage constraints based explanation for 
the low risk effect as suggested by Black (1972).13 The momentum factor also has a positive risk 
adjusted alpha that is borderline significant. The high risk neutral alpha is consistent with 
behavioral theories of momentum (Barberis, Shleifer, Vishny, 1998, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanya, 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999), but the observation that momentum underperforms 
dramatically in bad times is not easily aligned with the behavioral explanations. On a practical 
level, momentum underperforms in bad times because ‘momentum crashes’ generally happen 
during bad times (Daniel and Moskowitzch, 2016). Under some of our alternate definitions, 
momentum does not crash during bad times and accordingly it has an even higher risk neutral 
alpha.  
Much like CAPM alphas, our risk neutral alphas do not condition on the volatility of the 
strategy returns. Rescaling the reported alphas in Table 3 by the time series standard deviation of 
strategy returns (akin to an information ratio) yields nearly identical conclusions across the 
                                                            
13 Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) study the effect of leverage constraints in a dynamic model, and they find that tighter 
leverage constraints cause contemporaneously lower returns for low risk factors. To the extent that investors become 
more leverage constrained during bad times, our results are thus consistent with a leverage based explanation for the 
low risk effect. 
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characteristics. The two exceptions are for the profitability characteristic and the low volatility 
characteristics. Profitability has a low standard deviation, therefore strengthening our conclusion 
about its risk neutral performance; the low volatility portfolio has a high standard deviation 
because it is short high volatility stocks, and rescaling the low volatility portfolio to match the risk 
of the other strategies weakens our conclusion about its outperformance. 
 Relationship between Risk Neutral Alphas and CAPM Alphas 
If there are only two states of a world, our risk neutral alpha is identical to the CAPM 
alpha. To see this, note that the CAPM implies the following stochastic discount factor 
 ,ecapm ,e ,e,e1 [ ] [ ](1 ) (1 )var( )
w
w w
s sf f w
E rm r E r
r r r
     (9) 
where capmsm  is the value of the stochastic discount factor in state s and  
,ew
sr  is the excess return 
to the total wealth portfolio in state s. The value of the stochastic discount factor in state g and b 
are then 
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 (10) 
If we assume that the total wealth portfolio is the market portfolio – as usually done in when 
implementing the CAPM – the two values of m are identical to the values used for the risk 
neutral alpha specified in eq (6).  
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The two approaches yield the same alpha because they both use the return to the market 
portfolio as the basis of the value of the stochastic discount factor.  The difference between the 
two arises when there are more than two states, which is what the usual application of the CAPM 
implies. With more than two states, marginal utility for each state is not revealed by the returns to 
the market portfolio and the risk free rate, and we must resort to theory to figure out the value of 
the stochastic discount factor. The CAPM implies that the stochastic discount factor takes the form 
in (10), but this form is true only if the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient (Hansen and 
Richard, 1987) – and there is ample evidence that it is not.  
Instead, our approach limits the world to two states determined on the basis of economic 
intuition. Our approach is bound to be incomplete, but the hope is that it is closer to reality than 
specifying the stochastic discount factor for a continuum of states based on the CAPM 
assumptions.  The CAPM implicitly puts the same value on a loss in December 2008 and a loss in 
January 2004 (the market was up by 2.2 percent in both months), which is probably not something 
many investors would agree on.  
Our method also relates to the conditional CAPM. In the conditional CAPM, betas may be 
time-varying. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Lewellen and Nagel (2006) show that the value 
and the size factor both have higher betas when the expected return on the market portfolio is high. 
Gormsen and Jensen (2017) show that this result holds for most equity factors and that the result 
holds in other asset classes as well. This evidence of time-varying riskiness is, however, quite 
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different from the results in our paper: we focus on the conditional performance of the factors, not 
the conditional riskiness.14  
Rainy Day Portfolios  
We can draw on our results so far to design portfolios, encompassing potentially multiple 
characteristics, which outperform during bad times. The first, “Rainy Day Long Only”, is a long 
only portfolio designed to pay a high excess return during bad times. The second, “Rainy Day 
Hedged”, is a long/short portfolio that is long stocks that have high bad times alphas and short the 
market portfolio. The latter has the highest outperformance during bad times, but the investor must 
be able to hedge the market exposure to take full advantage of the outperformance.  
We start with the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio. This portfolio is long stocks with the 
highest excess return during bad times, reflecting investors who cannot hedge their exposure to 
the market portfolio and care only about excess returns. Low volatility and high book-to-market 
are the two characteristics associated with the highest bad times excess return, and accordingly we 
base the long only portfolio on these. At the beginning of each month, the Rainy Day Long Only 
portfolio goes long stocks with book-to-market in the highest 30th percentile and total volatility in 
the lowest 30th percentile. The portfolio is value weighted, refreshed every month, and rebalanced 
every month.  
 The Rainy Day Long Only portfolio has an excess return of -0.75 percent per month during 
rainy days, which is substantially better than the -2.3 percent the market portfolio delivers. Since 
most stocks have positive betas, it is hard to construct a long-only portfolio that does not suffer 
                                                            
14 Gormsen and Jensen’s results are nonetheless consistent with ours. The factors that have positive risk-neutral alphas 
also have positive conditional CAPM alphas, which is to say that neither their conditional performance nor their 
conditional riskiness can explain the factors’ high average return.    
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during rainy days, but the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio diminishes the loss by two thirds. In 
addition to beating the market during bad times, the long only portfolio also beats the market 
during good times, delivering an average excess return during these months of 1.03 percent, 
compared to the market excess returns of 0.73 percent.  
 The Rainy Day Hedged portfolio is long characteristics that are associated with the highest 
bad times alpha. The four characteristics associated with the highest bad times alphas are small 
market cap, value, profitability, and a low bid-ask spread. We exclude the bid-ask spread, since it 
is only available from 1982, and we construct the rainy day portfolio as follows. At the beginning 
of each month, the long leg of the rainy day portfolio buys stocks that have all of the following: 
Book-to-market in the highest 30th percentile, profitability in the highest 30th percentile, and 
market value below the median. This procedure results in a portfolio of around thirty firms in the 
beginning of the sample and several hundred firms by the end of the sample. The long leg of the 
portfolio is value-weighted, refreshed every month, and rebalanced every month. The Rainy Day 
Hedged portfolio is long 1 dollar in the long leg and short 1.05 dollars in the market portfolio to 
hedge its beta exposure.  
 As shown in Table 4, the bad times alpha of the hedged portfolio is 2.29 percent per month 
(t-statistic 3.36). This bad times alpha is higher than any of the individual factors we consider. In 
addition, the rainy day portfolio also has a positive good times alpha of 0.68 percent per month, 
meaning that the high performance during bad times does not come at the cost of 
underperformance during good times. The rainy day portfolio has a risk neutral alpha of 1.2 percent 
per month, which is higher than any of the other factors we consider. Accordingly, investors with 
average risk preferences should prefer the rainy day portfolio over both the market and the other 
factors. 
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 Figure 2 plots the cumulative log excess return to the Rainy Day Hedged portfolio and the 
market portfolio. The figure illustrates how the Rainy Day Hedged portfolio is fairly similar to the 
market during good times, but moves in the opposite direction to the market during bad times. The 
figure shows that the periods of underperformance tend to occur during the good times just before 
(but not during) financial crises.    
Part of the reason why the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio has a high return during bad 
times, relative to the market, is that the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio has a low beta. Contrary 
to the Rainy Day Hedged portfolio, the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio does not have particularly 
high rainy day alphas or risk neutral alphas. Rather, the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio combines 
a high average alpha with a low beta to ensure downside protection at a low cost.    
Finally, it is well known that combining profitability and value results in a high 
unconditional alpha (Novy-Marx, 2013). A natural concern, however, is that this unconditional 
alpha is compensation for poor performance during bad times. We show that not only is the value 
and profitability combination robust to controlling for bad times, it is actually the portfolio 
investors should hold if they are solely interested in generating high returns during bad times. 
Hedging Against Bad Times Using Put Options 
Another natural way to hedge against bad times is to buy long maturity put options. Since 
rainy days are periods where the market portfolio is in a drawdown, long maturity put options will 
generally increase in price during bad times, and thus serve as a hedge against these states. In this 
section, we show that investors can indeed hedge against bad times by using put options, but unlike 
the characteristics-based rainy day portfolios that we have described so far, using put options to 
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hedge against bad times is expensive during good times. Accordingly, the risk-neutral alpha of 
buying put options is close to zero.  
We consider two simple put option strategies. Both strategies are long at-the-money S&P 
500 put options with long maturities, but the maturity of the put options differs between the two 
strategies. The first strategy is long put options with maturity of one year. The second strategy is 
instead long the put option with the longest available maturity in the given month. At the end of 
each month, both strategies go long the appropriate put option, hold it for a month, and sell it again 
at the end of the subsequent month. We use end-of-day mid quotes as measures of price. All data 
is from the OptionMetrics database. The sample is from 1996 to 2013.  
Table 5 shows the performance of the two strategies. As expected, both strategies have 
negative returns in good times and positive returns in bad times. Since both strategies have fairly 
low CAPM betas, the excess returns translates into a negative good times alpha and a positive bad 
times alpha. For the one-year maturity strategy, the difference between the good times and bad 
times alpha is statistically significant, as can be seen from the estimate on the bad times dunmy. 
The good and bad times alphas for the two put option strategies appear consistent with the 
state prices we have identified using the market portfolio. Indeed, the risk neutral alpha for Strategy 
2 is close to zero, and statistically insignificant. The near-zero risk-neutral alpha stands in stark 
contrast to the risk-neutral CAPM alpha shown at the bottom of the table. Consistent with much 
prior work, the CAPM alpha is large and negative, and it is statistically significant for the one-year 
maturity strategy.15 In other words, the seemingly poor performance of the put-writing strategy is 
                                                            
15 See most recently Jurek and Stafford (2015) 
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best understood in a framework in which investors command a premium for assets that perform 
well in bad times. Our simple two state representation cleanly illustrates this logic. 
IV. Extensions 
In this section, we describe three extensions. We first explore “defensive” industries, 
defined as industries that outperform during bad times. We then extend our results to international 
data, as well as repeating our main results using alternate definitions of bad times.  
Defensive Industries 
Table 6 shows the performance of the 49 Fama and French industry portfolios during good 
and bad times. The three industries with the worst absolute performance during bad times are real 
estate, construction, and machinery. The three industries with the best performance are Gold, 
smoking related, and coal. Looking across the 49 portfolios, there is only a modest correlation of 
0.23 between rainy day alpha and unconditional CAPM alpha. This low correlation suggests that 
merely holding industries with high CAPM alpha will not result in a particularly high 
outperformance during rainy days. In addition, the correlation between bad times alpha and good 
times alpha is -0.15, which means that industries that tend to outperform in good times tend to 
underperform in bad times (and vice versa). For comparison, the risk factors studied earlier have 
a correlation between CAPM alpha and bad times alpha of -0.09 (0.23 for industries) and they 
have a correlation between good times alpha and bad times alpha of -0.37 (-0.15 for industries). 
These results suggest that the industries are less sensitive to the state of the economy than the risk 
factors are.  
The level of the outperformance among the industries is modest: most industries have 
CAPM alphas and risk neutral alphas close to zero. Together the results suggest that protection 
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against bad times is more easily obtained through positions in the risk factors, or the Rainy Day 
portfolios, than through positions in the industry portfolios.  
 
International Stocks during Bad Times 
We repeat our main analysis from Table 3 using a broad sample of international stocks. 
We construct a set of international risk factors for our international robustness check. The 
international risk factors are the value-weighted return to twenty-four national risk factors. That 
is, the return to an international risk factor f is given by 
ݎ௧ାଵ௙,୥୪୭ୠୟ୪ ൌ ∑ ఓ೟
ೕ
∑ ఓ೟ೕೕ
ݎ௧ାଵ௙,௝௃௝ୀଵ   (11)  
where ߤ௧௝ is the market capitalization of country ݆  at time ݐ. The national risk factors are constructed 
similarly to the Fama and French portfolios, except that outside the U.S., the portfolio breakpoints 
are based on the largest 20 percent of the firms in a given country (rather than NYSE breakpoints).  
 Table 7 presents our main asset pricing test for the international sample. The results are 
similar to the results in the U.S. sample. For eight out of the nine factors we consider, the sign on 
the bad times dummy is the same in the international sample and in the U.S. sample. Additionally, 
size, value, and profitability have the largest bad times alphas both in the international sample and 
in the U.S. sample, which suggest a certain degree of robustness of the ranking of the factors’ bad 
times alphas.   
As in the U.S. sample, only value and profitability have statistically significant risk neutral 
alphas. The t-statistics of these two factors are approximately the same in the international sample 
and in the U.S. sample despite the international sample being substantially shorter. The high t-
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statistics in the short international sample suggest that, for value and profitability, the ratio of risk-
neutral alpha to volatility is larger in the international sample. For value, the higher ratio mainly 
comes from a lower volatility, whereas for profit, it mainly comes from a higher risk neutral alpha.  
 The only factor that differs substantially across the two samples is the growth factor. In the 
U.S., growth outperforms in good times but underperforms in bad times, whereas in the global 
sample, growth outperforms in bad times but underperforms in good times. 
Robustness Tests on Definitions of Bad Times 
In Table 1 we described alternate measures of bad times. Table 8 replicates our main asset 
pricing tests from Table 3 using these alternate measures. Recall that our main conclusion from 
Table 3 was that size, value, and profitability outperformed during bad times, and even more so 
than during good times. For size, this conclusion is robust across all our definitions of bad times, 
expect for financial crises. For value and profitability, this conclusion is robust across all our 
definitions of bad times. The value factor does, however, lose much of its bad times alpha when 
we consider the drawdown measure of bad times, reflecting that it does not do well in periods 
leading up to a rainy day period. Profitability, on the other hand, does better under our drawdown 
measure, reflecting that it does well in periods leading up to a rainy day period. 
 Our Rainy Day Hedged portfolio is also robust to different definitions of bad times. The 
Rainy Day Hedged portfolio struggles the most during the drawdown and the financial crisis 
definitions of bad times, but it still maintains a statistically significant monthly bad times alpha of 
1.34 percent during these definitions.  
 Under our baseline definition of bad times, the good unconditional performance of illiquid 
stocks is explained by conditional underperformance in bad times. This result is intuitive, but it is 
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not robust to other definitions of bad times. During economic bad times, for instance, low turnover 
stocks and low Amihud ratio stocks do worse than in good times, but they still have a positive bad 
times alpha. During financial bad times, the turnover factor and the Amihud factor have negative 
bad times alphas, but the bad times alphas are not negative enough to justify the high good times 
alphas.  
The safety, growth, and total volatility factors all have negative rainy day alphas, but this 
result is not robust to other definitions of bad times. While they have lower bad times alpha than 
good times alpha across all definitions of bad times, the good times alphas are sufficiently large 
for the bad times alphas to remain positive under most definitions of bad times.  
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze the cross-section of stock returns during bad times.  We emphasize 
two contributions. First, we identify the characteristics of stocks that an investor who is worried 
about bad times should buy. For a long-only investor, this “rainy day” portfolio contains low 
volatility value stocks, and, counterintuitively, also performs reasonably well during good times. 
For an investor who can hedge her exposure to the overall stock market, the rainy day portfolio 
includes small, profitable value stocks.  
Our second contribution is to propose a simple methodology to risk-adjust investment 
strategy returns in a state-contingent manner. The essence of the methodology is to place greater 
weight on performance achieved during bad times than performance achieved during good times, 
essentially evaluating returns under a risk neutral probability measure.   
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Appendix: Risk Neutral Alphas 
We describe here the general procedure for recovering risk neutral alphas for any strategy 
k, a set of defined states of nature S, and a set of reference factor portfolios used to estimate required 
returns in different states. The logic of our approach is similar to Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) 
who back out the restrictions on discount factors that would be required to price a given set of 
returns. 
Consider an economy with S states of nature and K≥S factors. The pricing equation for 
factor k is: 
1
1 [ ] ,
S
k k
s s s
s
E mR m R

   (A1) 
where 1k f ks sR r r   is 1 plus the risk free rate plus the excess return to factor k in state s, ms is 
the stochastic discount factor in state s, and πs is the probability of state s. 
 We can write (A1) for the risk free rate and the remaining J=S-1 factors in matrix form as: 
 ˆ1 ΠR  (A2) 
where 1 is an S ×1 vectors of 1’s, R is an S ×S matrix where the first row is 1 plus the risk free 
rate, and the kth row contains the gross return to the k-1th factor in states 1 through S, and Πˆ is 
an S ×1 vector with msπs on the rows. 
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If none of the J assets are linear combinations of the other along the S-1 states, then R has 
full rank and we can solve for and Πˆ as  
1ˆ 1Π R  (A5) 
We define the risk-neutral alpha for any strategy as  
,e
,rn [ ] ˆ(1
[ ]
k
k f kE mr r r
E m
    )Π  (A6) 
where ࢘࢑ is an ܵ ൈ 1 vector of excess returns in the S states for factor k. The above is the expected 
return under the risk-neutral measure. 
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Figure 1: Measuring bad times 
This figure shows the time-series of bad times, marked by grey bars. Bad times are defined as quarters with both 
economic and financial bad times. Financial bad times are quarters where either the quarterly or the 12-month market 
excess returns is in the lowest quintile of the time-series. Economic bad times are quarters for which at least one of 
the months is defined as a recession by NBER. In the international sample, Economic bad times are quarters where 
the growth in the OECD countries’ aggregate GDP is in the lowest quintile, and Financial bad times are quarters where 
either the quarterly or the yearly excess return to the global market portfolio is in the lowest quintile of the time-series. 
Panel A: US time-series 1963-2013. 
 
Panel B: International Bad Times, 1987-2013 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Return to Rainy Day portfolios 
This figure shows the cumulative log excess return to the rainy day portfolios and the market portfolio. Panel A shows 
the return to the Rainy Day Hedged portfolio and Panel B shows the return to the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio. 
Rainy days are marked with gray bars. Rainy days are defined as quarters with both economic and financial bad times. 
Financial bad times are quarters where either the quarterly or the yearly market excess returns is in the lowest quintile. 
Economic bad times are quarters for which at least one month is defined as a recession by the NBER. The Rainy Day 
portfolios are constructed as follows. The long leg of the Rainy Day Hedged portfolio consists of stocks that have all 
of the following: Book-to-market in the highest 30th percentile, profitability in the highest 30th percentile, and market 
value below the median. The long leg is value-weighted, refreshed every month, and rebalanced every month. The 
Rainy Day Hedged portfolio is long one dollar in the long leg and short 1.05 dollars in the market portfolio. The Rainy 
Day Long Only portfolio consists of stocks that have all of the following: Book-to-market in the highest 30th percentile 
and volatility in the lowest 30th percentile. The long leg is value-weighted, refreshed every month, and rebalanced 
every month. The sample is 1963-2013. 
Panel A. Cumulative return to the Rainy Day Hedged portfolio  
 
Panel B. Cumulative return to the Rainy Day Long Only portfolio 
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Table 1. Bad Times 
This table reports time-series averages of economic and financial variables during bad times. Bad times are defined as quarters 
with both economic and financial bad times. Financial bad times are quarters where either the quarterly or the yearly market 
excess returns is in the lowest quintile of the time-series. Economic bad times are quarters for which at least one of the months 
is defined as a recession by NBER. Drawdown is quarters that are between the beginning and the maximum of a drawdown 
that reaches at least 10 percent.  The market excess return is the excess return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio. GDP 
growth is the quarterly change in real GDP. Inflation is the quarterly change in the consumer price index. Earnings growth is 
the quarterly change in one-year earnings of the stock market. The change in the home price index is the quarterly change in 
the Case-Shiller home price index. Unemployment is measured at the end of each quarter. The Noise measure is the noise in 
the term structure as defined by Hu, Pan, Wang (2013). The Noise measure, the TED spread, and the VIX are measured at 
the end of each quarter.  All numbers are expressed in percent except the noise measure and the change in the home price 
index. All percentages are annualized. The sample is from 1963-2013 in the U.S.  
 
Baseline: 
All Quarters
Alternate Ways to Identify Bad Times 
 
Bad 
times: 
Baseline Finance 
Econo
mic 
Finance 
only 
Econ 
only 
Draw-
down All Global 
     
1963-
2013 Quarters 204 27 50 34 23 7 47 22 14 
           
Market returns (%)    
1963-2013 Average excess market 6.3 -19.4 -22.1 -7.4 -25.2 39.0 -30.2 -36.7 -15.7 
1963-2013 Volatility of market 17.2 26.0 22.5 26.7 17.8 13.6 16.0 19.4 26.0 
           
Economic growth and inflation (%)        
1963-2013 Average GDP growth 3.0 -1.1 1.1 -1.3 3.6 -2.0 1.6 -1.0  
 Global GDP growth       -0.9 
1963-2013 Average earnings growth  4.0 -24.3 -6.2 -21.9 14.9 -13.0 -12.1 -22.0  
 Volatility of earnings 18.5 18.7 22.3 16.8 22.0 2.7 13.9 16.2  
1963-2013 Average inflation 4.0 5.9 5.1 5.7 4.2 4.9 5.2 5.9  
 Volatility of inflation 1.9 3.1 2.5 2.9 1.4 2.2 2.6 3.5  
1963-2013 Average unemployment 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.6 5.8 7.7 5.7 6.1  
1963-2013 Δ in home price index 0.7 -5.2 -1.4 -5.4 3.1 -6.2 -2.7 -6.5  
         
Liquidity measures (%)        
1985-2013 Average TED spread 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.4 0.9 1.0  
1985-2013 Average VIX 21.0 30.9 31.8 29.6 32.6 21.2 30.2 32.3  
1987-2013 Term structure noise 3.5 6.7 5.2 6.4 3.7 4.4 5.5 7.1  
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Table 2. Characteristics of Stocks with Ex Post Good Performance during Bad Times 
This table shows characteristics of portfolios sorted on ex-post performance of US stocks during bad times occurring between 1963 and 2013. All characteristics are 
measured as percentile ranks. For example, column 2 of Panel A shows that the worst performing stocks during bad times disproportionately contain growth stocks. Panel 
A shows portfolios sorted on excess returns, and Panel B shows portfolios sorted on CAPM alpha. We pool series of consecutive Rainy Day quarters into a total of seven 
periods and calculate returns and CAPM alpha for each stock each period. For each period, we form a set of portfolios based on quintiles of excess return or CAPM alpha. 
For each period and portfolio, we estimate ex ante characteristics of the portfolios based on equal weights. The final characteristic estimate for each portfolio is then the 
weighted time series average across the seven periods of consecutive rainy days. The time series weights are the number of quarters each period lasts. Characteristics are 
measured in percentiles of the cross-section. CAPM alpha is the excess return on the stock minus the product of the excess market return and the ex ante estimate of the 
stock’s beta. Rainy days are defined as quarters with both economic and financial bad times. More details on the construction of characteristics (size, book-to-market, and 
so on) is provided in the main text.  
Panel A: Characteristics of Stocks Sorted on Ex Post Excess Returns during Bad Times (all measured as percentile ranks) 
 
Size and Value Good Fundamentals Low Risk Momentum Illiquidity 
 Size BM Profit Growth Safety 
Total 
Volatility Momentum 
Amihud 
Ratio Turnover 
Bid-Ask 
Spread    
(low return)          1 43.5 48.5 43.6 51.0 37.4 66.2 44.5 47.8 59.0 44.3 
2 51.4 47.7 50.6 51.7 49.8 51.1 50.3 49.2 51.4 52.4 
3 55.7 49.7 52.2 50.9 55.0 42.6 53.8 48.7 47.2 55.4 
4 55.4 49.4 55.0 48.8 58.8 38.7 54.6 50.3 44.6 52.6 
(high return)          5 48.2 53.6 50.7 47.6 52.5 46.5 49.5 53.1 46.3 49.8 
 
5 - 1 4.7 5.1 7.1 -3.4 15.0 -19.7 5.1 5.3 -12.7 5.5 
Panel B: Characteristics of Stocks Sorted on Ex Post Alpha During Bad Times (all measured as percentile ranks) 
 
Size and Value Good Fundamentals Low Risk Momentum Illiquidity 
 Size BM Profit Growth Safety 
Total 
Volatility Momentum 
Amihud 
Ratio Turnover 
Bid-Ask 
Spread    
(low alpha)          1 43.2 48.9 45.4 49.8 42.8 59.1 47.2 51.0 52.8 47.7 
2 51.7 49.5 50.4 50.0 53.7 44.7 52.2 50.5 47.3 55.5 
3 55.8 48.8 53.3 50.4 56.7 41.8 53.8 48.7 47.0 55.0 
4 56.4 48.6 53.7 50.7 54.9 43.4 52.5 48.1 48.5 50.3 
(high alpha)          5 48.3 52.4 49.9 49.8 45.7 55.9 47.5 49.6 54.1 44.7 
 
5 - 1 5.1 3.4 4.5 0.0 2.9 -3.2 0.3 -1.4 1.3 -3.0 
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Table 3. Performance of Characteristic-sorted Portfolios during Bad Times 
This table reports the conditional performance of characteristic-sorted portfolios based on US stocks 1963-2013. Panel A shows summary statistics of each risk factor 
during rainy day months and good months. Panel B shows conditional alphas for each risk factor. For each risk factor, we run a regression of monthly excess return on a 
dummy variable and the monthly excess market return: 
,e 1 ( )p m ft u b b t tr r r u        
where 1b is a dummy equal to 1 if the month is defined as a rainy day month and zero otherwise. Risk neutral alpha is the weighted sum of the average good times return 
and the average rainy day return where the weights are the risk neutral probabilities as implied by the market portfolio and the risk-free rate.  
,e
,rn [ ]
[ ]
p
p E mr
E m
   
The risk neutral probabilities are 0.33 for rainy days and 0.67 for good times. Rainy days are defined as quarters with both economic and financial bad times. Financial 
bad times are quarters where either the quarterly or the yearly market excess returns is in the lowest quintile. Economic bad times are quarters for which at least one month 
is defined as a recession by the NBER. t-statistics are reported below parameter estimates in parenthesis and statistical significance at the five percent level is indicated in 
bold. Returns are alphas are in monthly percent. Sharpe Ratios and Information ratios are annualized. More details on the construction of characteristics (size, book-to-
market, and so on) are provided in the main text.  
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Long-Short Portfolios 
 Size and Value Good Fundamentals Low Risk Momentum Illiquidity 
Characteristic: Size 
Value-
Growth Profit Growth Safety 
Total 
Volatility UMD Amihud Turnover Bid-ask 
Long side of portfolio: Small Value Profitable Growing Safe Low risk Winners Illiquid 
Low 
turnover High Bid- Ask 
Number of months 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 384 
Number of rainy months 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 42 
           
Excess return good times (%) 0.34 0.27 0.17 0.22 0.04 -0.02 0.76 -0.06 -0.10 0.10 
 (2.71) (2.14) (2.01) (3.21) (0.23)  (-0.09) (5.25)  (-0.78)  (-0.63) (0.70) 
Excess return rainy days (%) 0.12 1.19 0.62 -0.01 1.07 1.41 0.06 0.31 0.82 0.07 
(0.30) (1.92) (2.38) (-0.05) (1.54) (1.68) (0.08) (1.08) (1.35) (0.08) 
Sharpe Ratio (good times) 0.41 0.32 0.30 0.48 0.03 -0.01 0.79 -0.12 -0.09 0.13 
Sharpe Ratio (bad times) 0.12 0.74 0.92 -0.02 0.59 0.65 0.03 0.41 0.52 0.04 
Inf. Ratio (good times) 0.22 0.38 0.48 0.60 0.76 0.63 0.90 0.22 0.48 0.65 
Inf.  Ratio (bad times) 0.45 0.67 0.67 -0.20 -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.21 -0.42 
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Panel B. Rainy Day Alphas and Risk Neutral Alphas 
 Size and Value Good Fundamentals Low risk Momentum Liquidity factors 
Characteristic: Size 
Value-
Growth Profit Growth Safety 
Total 
Volatility UMD Amihud Turnover Bid-ask 
Long side of portfolio: Small Value Profitable Growing Safe Low vol Winners Illiquid 
Low 
turnover High Bid- Ask   
αu: Good times alpha 0.18 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.65 0.67 0.89 0.11 0.40 0.43 
(t) (1.42) (2.14) (3.04) (3.80) (4.77) (3.97) (4.93) (1.34) (2.99) (2.93) 
αb:Rainy day dummy 0.27 0.77 0.18 -0.37 -0.84 -0.68 -1.08 -0.15 -0.63 -0.99 
(t) (0.76) (1.87) (0.78) (-1.94) (-2.21) (-1.46) (-2.17) (-0.67) (-1.68) (-2.25) 
β 0.19 -0.06 -0.11 -0.06 -0.73 -0.82 -0.15 -0.20 -0.60 -0.34 
(t) (7.08) (-1.85) (-6.08) (-3.90) (-25.49) (-23.27) (-3.92) (-12.28) (-21.41) (-11.24) 
           
αu+ αb: Rainy day alpha 0.45 1.09 0.43 -0.11 -0.18 -0.01 -0.19 -0.04 -0.22 -0.56 
(t) (1.38) (2.87) (2.03) (-0.60) (-0.53) (-0.02) (-0.42) (-0.20) (-0.65) (-1.37) 
           
Risk neutral alpha 0.27 0.57 0.31 0.14 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.06 0.20 0.09 
(t) (1.69) (2.58) (3.05) (1.77) (1.46) (1.44) (1.86) (0.53) (0.87) (0.35) 
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Table 4. Rainy Day Portfolios 
This table describes the performance of portfolios constructed to maximize performance during bad times. We 
consider two portfolios: a market neutral “rainy day hedged” portfolio, and a “rainy day long only” portfolio. 
Portfolios are constructed as follows. The long leg of the Rainy Day Hedged portfolio consists of stocks that 
have all of the following: Book-to-market in the highest 30th percentile, profitability in the highest 30th percentile, 
and market value below the median. The long leg is value-weighted, refreshed every month, and rebalanced 
every month. The Rainy Day Hedged portfolio is long one dollar in the long leg and short 1.05 dollars in the 
market portfolio. The Rainy Day Long Only portfolio consists of stocks that have all of the following: Book-to-
market in the highest 30th percentile and volatility in the lowest 30th percentile. The long leg is value-weighted, 
refreshed every month, and rebalanced every month. t-statistics are reported below parameter estimates in 
parenthesis and statistical significance at the five percent level is indicated in bold. After summarizing excess 
returns, Sharpe ratios, and information ratios during good and bad times, we the report the results of a time series 
regression of monthly excess return on a dummy variable and the monthly excess market return: 
,e 1 ( )p m ft u b b t tr r r u        
where 1b is a dummy equal to 1 if the month is defined as a rainy day month and zero otherwise. Risk neutral 
alpha is the weighted sum of the average good times return and the average rainy day return where the weights 
are the risk neutral probabilities as implied by the market portfolio and the risk-free rate.  
,e
,rn [ ]
[ ]
p
p E mr
E m
   
The risk neutral probabilities are 0.33 for rainy days and 0.67 for good times. The risk neutral probabilities are 
0.33 for rainy days and 0.67 for good times. Rainy days are defined as quarters with both economic and financial 
bad times. The sample is 1963-2013. 
 
 Rainy Day Hedged 
Portfolio 
Rainy Day Long Only 
Portfolio 
Number of months 612 612 
Number of rainy months 81 81 
Excess return good times 0.68 1.03 
 (4.42) (6.38) 
Excess return during bad times 2.29 -0.75 
 (3.36) (-1.18) 
SR good times 0.66 0.96 
SR bad times 1.29 -0.45 
IR good times 0.66 0.61 
IR bad times 1.29 0.40 
 
αu: Good times alpha 0.68 0.47 
(t) (3.86) (3.83) 
Rainy day dummy 1.61 -0.08 
(3.34) (-0.23) 
Beta 0.00 0.66 
 (0.03) (25.71) 
Risk neutral alpha 1.20 0.44 
 (4.73) (1.89) 
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Table 5. Good and Bad Times Performance of Buying At the Money Put Options  
This table describes the performance of portfolios that is long deep out of the money put options. We consider 
two portfolios: the first portfolio is long put options with one-year maturity and the second portfolio is long the 
put option with longest available maturity on the given day. The portfolios are constructed at the end of each 
month and held for one month. After summarizing excess returns, Sharpe ratios, and information ratios during 
good and bad times, we report the results of a time series regression of monthly excess return on a dummy 
variable and the monthly excess market return: 
,e 1 ( )p m ft u b b t tr r r u        
where 1bt is a dummy equal to 1 if the month is defined as a rainy day month and zero otherwise. Risk neutral 
alpha is the weighted sum of the average good times return and the average rainy day return where the weights 
are the risk neutral probabilities as implied by the market portfolio and the risk-free rate.  
,e
,rn [ ]
[ ]
p
p E mr
E m
   
The risk neutral probabilities are 0.33 for rainy days and 0.67 for good times. The risk neutral probabilities are 
0.33 for rainy days and 0.67 for good times. Rainy days are defined as quarters with both economic and financial 
bad times. The sample is 1963-2013. 
 
 Portfolio 1:  
Buy 1-yr put options  
on S&P 500 
Portfolio 2:  
Buy longest maturity 
available options 
   
Number of months 213 213 
Number of rainy months 30 30 
Excess return good times -2.34 -1.45 
 -(3.44) -(2.11) 
Excess return during rainy days 2.37 2.51 
 (0.98) (1.05) 
SR good times -0.88 -0.54 
SR bad times 0.62 0.66 
IR good times -0.84 -0.48 
IR bad times 0.57 0.61 
 
αu: Good times alpha -2.24 -1.29 
(t) -(3.01) -(1.74) 
Rainy day dummy 4.41 3.54 
(2.22) (1.78) 
Beta -0.12 -0.16 
 -(0.80) -(1.08) 
Risk neutral alpha -0.73 -0.09 
 -(0.76) -(0.10) 
   
CAPM alpha -1.58 -0.77 
 -(2.30) -(1.12) 
 
  
‐‐41‐‐ 
 
Table 6. Defensive Industries 
This table reports conditional performance of forty-nine Fama and French industries. Industries are sorted by their average 
monthly performance during bad times. For each portfolio, we run a regression of monthly excess return on a dummy variable 
and the monthly excess market return: 
,e 1 ( )p m ft u b b t tr r r u        
where 1b is a dummy equal to 1 if the month is defined as a rainy day month and zero otherwise. Good times alpha is the 
intercept αu. Rainy days alpha is the intercept αu plus the parameter estimate of the dummy variable αbt. The CAPM alpha is 
the intercept in a time-series regression of excess return on the market excess return. Risk neutral alpha is the weighted sum 
of the average good times return and the average rainy day return where the weights are the risk neutral probabilities as 
implied by the market portfolio and the risk-free rate.  
,e
,rn [ ]
[ ]
p
p E mr
E m
   
The risk neutral probabilities are 0.33 for rainy days and 0.67 for good times. Rainy days are defined as quarters with both 
economic and financial bad times. Financial bad times are quarters where either the quarterly or the yearly market excess 
returns is in the lowest quintile. Economic bad times are quarters for which at least one month is defined as a recession by 
the NBER. t-statistics are reported below parameter estimates in parenthesis and statistical significance at the five percent 
level is indicated in bold. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent. The sample is from 1963-2013.  
 
  
Excess returns (% monthly) Alphas (% monthly) 
 #  Industry 
Average 
Good 
times 
Bad 
Times 
Good 
times 
(αu) 
Bad 
Times 
(αu+ αb) CAPM  
Risk 
neutral 
47 Real Estate 0.33 0.86 -3.16 -0.10 -1.19 -0.25 -0.46 
18 Construction 0.56 1.02 -2.40 -0.08 -0.15 -0.09 -0.10 
21 Mach  0.55 0.99 -2.35 -0.04 -0.25 -0.07 -0.11 
45 Banks 0.45 0.86 -2.25 0.00 -0.48 -0.07 -0.16 
24 Aero  0.77 1.23 -2.24 0.28 -0.31 0.20 0.09 
38 Lab Equipment 0.72 1.17 -2.21 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.06 
6 Toys  0.56 0.98 -2.20 -0.15 0.12 -0.11 -0.06 
8 Books 0.64 1.07 -2.18 0.19 -0.37 0.11 0.01 
37 Chips 0.57 0.99 -2.18 -0.16 0.18 -0.11 -0.05 
46 Insurance 0.55 0.96 -2.15 0.21 -0.61 0.10 -0.06 
22 Electical Eq. 0.71 1.13 -2.09 0.14 -0.06 0.11 0.08 
48 Financial Services 0.64 1.06 -2.08 0.12 -0.15 0.08 0.03 
34 Business Services 0.58 0.97 -1.99 -0.05 0.10 -0.03 0.00 
44 Meals 0.74 1.15 -1.97 0.24 -0.10 0.19 0.13 
11 Health 0.67 1.13 -1.91 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.13 
23 Autos 0.47 0.84 -1.91 -0.12 0.07 -0.10 -0.06 
36 Software 0.52 0.90 -1.88 -0.40 0.86 -0.22 0.01 
17 Building Materials 0.64 1.02 -1.84 0.05 0.15 0.07 -0.03 
20 FabPr 0.50 0.85 -1.84 -0.10 0.11 -0.07 0.08 
15 Rubber 0.54 0.89 -1.80 -0.07 0.17 -0.03 0.01 
35 Hardware 0.57 0.92 -1.78 -0.03 0.18 0.00 0.04 
28 Mines 0.62 0.98 -1.75 0.01 0.24 0.05 0.09 
41 Transportation 0.55 0.88 -1.65 -0.03 0.22 0.00 0.05 
9 Household 0.57 0.90 -1.63 0.18 -0.14 0.13 0.07 
14 Chemicals 0.56 0.89 -1.60 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.07 
49 Other 0.47 0.78 -1.58 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.01 
1 Agricultural 0.46 0.76 -1.57 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.16 
30 Oil   0.66 1.00 -1.57 0.34 -0.21 0.26 0.00 
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Excess returns (% monthly) Alphas (% monthly) 
 #  Industry 
Average 
Good 
times 
Bad 
Times 
Good 
times 
(αu) 
Bad 
Times 
(αu+ αb) CAPM  
Risk 
neutral 
10 Clothing 0.58 0.90 -1.52 0.00 0.34 0.04 0.11 
25 Ships 0.75 1.09 -1.47 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.25 
19 Steel 0.43 0.71 -1.46 -0.31 0.65 -0.18 0.00 
16 Textiles 0.52 0.81 -1.39 -0.14 0.55 -0.04 0.09 
7 Fun   0.86 1.20 -1.37 0.12 0.86 0.22 0.36 
40 Boxes 0.62 0.92 -1.31 0.14 0.27 0.16 0.18 
33 Personal Services 0.38 0.63 -1.29 -0.36 0.74 -0.21 0.00 
32 Telecom 0.47 0.73 -1.24 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 
3 Soda  0.79 1.09 -1.20 0.48 0.05 0.42 0.34 
31 Utilities  0.41 0.65 -1.19 0.20 -0.25 0.13 0.27 
42 Wholesale 0.69 0.98 -1.19 0.09 0.63 0.17 0.05 
39 Paper 0.57 0.84 -1.15 -0.02 0.60 0.07 0.19 
12 Med. Equipment 0.76 1.04 -1.10 0.30 0.41 0.32 0.34 
43 Retail 0.61 0.86 -1.02 0.04 0.66 0.12 0.24 
13 Drugs 0.68 0.94 -0.99 0.27 0.38 0.28 0.30 
26 Guns  0.84 1.10 -0.86 0.35 0.68 0.39 0.46 
2 Food  0.64 0.82 -0.51 0.26 0.65 0.31 0.39 
4 Beer  0.72 0.89 -0.44 0.27 0.85 0.35 0.46 
27 Gold  0.55 0.70 -0.41 0.03 0.96 0.16 0.34 
5 Smoke 1.04 1.22 -0.13 0.63 1.09 0.69 0.78 
29 Coal  0.56 0.66 -0.05 -0.34 1.99 -0.01 0.43 
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Table 7. International Results 
This table reports conditional performance of characteristic-sorted portfolio in the international sample 1987-2013. For each risk factor, we run a regression of monthly 
excess return on a dummy variable and the monthly excess return to the global market portfolio: 
,e 1 ( )p m ft u b b t tr r r u        
where 1b is a dummy equal to 1 if the month is defined as a bad times month and zero otherwise. Risk neutral alpha is the weighted sum of the average good times 
return and the average return during bad times where the weights are the risk neutral probabilities as implied by the market portfolio and the risk-free rate. The risk 
neutral probabilities are 0.65 for rainy days and 0.35 for good times. The market excess return is the excess return to the value weighted portfolio of all firms. The 
national portfolios are constructed as the intersection of six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and the relevant characteristic. The size break-point is the median 
NYSE market equity in the U.S. and the 80th percentile of market equity in international countries. The Total volatility, Amihud, Turnover, or Bid-ask spread 
breakpoints are the 30th and 70th percentile conditional on size. Portfolios are refreshed every calendar month and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value 
weights. t-statistics are reported below parameter estimates in parenthesis and statistical significance at the five percent level is indicated in bold. Alphas are in monthly 
percent.  
 Size and Value Good Fundamentals Low risk Momentum Liquidity factors 
Characteristic: Size 
Value-
Growth Profit Growth Safety 
Total 
Volatility UMD Amihud Turnover 
Long side of portfolio: Small Value Profitable Growing Safe Low vol Winners Illiquid 
Low 
turnover 
Number of months 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 
Number of rainy months 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42   
αu: Good times alpha 0.06 0.28 0.42 -0.04 0.24 0.70 0.92 0.07 0.26 
(t) (0.50) (1.62) (4.99) (-0.39) (2.29) (3.52) (4.12) (0.76) (1.69)
αb :Rainy day dummy 0.39 0.99 0.19 0.37 -0.09 -0.63 -1.34 -0.53 -0.66 
(t) (1.10) (2.09) (0.82) (1.44) (-0.31) (-1.13) (-2.16) -(1.94) (-1.56)
β 0.06 0.05 -0.19 -0.01 -0.28 -0.65 -0.24 -0.24 -0.48 
(t) (2.44) (1.46) (-11.08) (-0.40) -(13.48) (-16.25) (-5.48) -(12.50) (-15.61)
αu+ αb: Rainy day alpha 0.45 1.27 0.62 0.33 0.15 0.08 -0.42 -0.45 -0.41 
(t) (1.37) (2.88) (2.81) (1.40) (0.56) (0.15) (-0.74) (-1.80) (-1.03) 
Risk neutral alpha 0.20 0.62 0.49 0.09 0.20 0.48 0.44 -0.11 0.02 
(t) (1.46) (2.28) (3.49) (0.86) (1.05) (1.10) (1.03) (-0.79) (0.09) 
Rainy Day dummy same sign as 
US? YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 8. Robustness to Definitions of Bad Times 
This table repeats the analysis from Panel B of Table 3 under alternate definitions of bad times. Rainy days are defined as quarters with both economic and financial 
bad times. Financial bad times are quarters where either the quarterly or the yearly market excess returns is in the lowest quintile. Economic bad times are quarters for 
which at least one month is defined as a recession by the NBER. Drawdown is quarters between the beginning and the maximum of a drawdown that reaches at least 
10 percent. All is the intersection of all our measures of bad times. t-statistics are reported below parameter estimates in parenthesis and statistical significance at the 
five percent level is indicated in bold. Alphas are in monthly percent. The sample is 1963-2013.  
 
  
Size and value Good Fundamentals Low Risk Momentum Liquidity factors 
Com-
posite 
  SMB 
Value-
Growth Profit Growth Safety 
Total 
Volatility UMD Amihud Turnover Bid-Ask 
Rainy 
day 
hedged      
Number of observations: 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 384 612 
Rainy days (Baseline from Table 3): 
αu: Good times alpha 0.18 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.65 0.71 0.89 0.11 0.40 0.43 0.67 
(t) (1.42) (2.14) (3.04) (3.80) (4.77) (4.44) (4.93) (1.34) (2.99) (2.93) (3.83) 
αb: Bad times dummy 0.27 0.77 0.18 -0.37 -0.84 -0.77 -1.08 -0.15 -0.63 -0.99 1.62 
(t) (0.76) (1.87) (0.78) (-1.94) (-2.21) (-1.75) (-2.17) (-0.67) (-1.68) (-2.25) (3.34) 
αu+ αb: Alpha during rainy 
days 0.45 1.09 0.43 -0.11 -0.18 -0.06 -0.19 -0.04 -0.22 -0.56 2.29
(t) (1.38) (2.87) (2.03) (-0.60) -(0.53) -(0.16) -(0.42) (-0.20)  (-0.65) (-1.37) (5.14) 
            
Financial bad times:                       
αu: Good times alpha 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.66 0.69 1.01 0.15 0.43 0.41 0.73
(t) (1.85) (1.70) (2.19) (2.87) (4.41) (3.98) (5.17) (1.70) (2.93) (2.56) (3.78) 
αb: Bad times dummy -0.15 0.58 0.31 -0.02 -0.48 -0.36 -1.06 -0.24 -0.44 -0.41 0.65 
(t) (-0.52) (1.74) (1.64) (-0.14) -(1.55) -(1.01) -(2.64) (-1.32) -(1.46) (-1.20) (1.65) 
αu+ αb: Alpha during bad 
economic times 
0.11 0.86 0.51 0.20 0.18 0.33 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 1.38
(0.45) (3.03) (3.19) (1.48) (0.71) (1.10) (-0.14) (-0.58) -(0.05) (0.00) (4.11) 
            
            
            
[Continued overleaf]           
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Size and value Good Fundamentals Low Risk Momentum Liquidity factors 
Com-
posite 
  SMB 
Value-
Growth Profit Growth Safety 
Total 
Volatility UMD Amihud Turnover Bid-Ask 
Rainy 
day 
hedged      
Economic bad times:                  
αu: Good times alpha 0.18 0.36 0.21 0.24 0.62 0.65 0.83 0.10 0.37 0.42 0.67
(t) (1.36) (2.36) (2.50) (3.44) (4.44) (4.02) (4.54) (1.21) (2.70) (2.83) (3.74) 
αb: Bad times dummy 0.24 0.40 0.39 -0.18 -0.49 -0.31 -0.56 -0.07 -0.32 -0.73 1.33
(t) (0.77) (1.08) (1.89) (-1.05) (-1.43) (-0.79) (-1.25) (-0.34) (-0.94) (-1.88) (3.06) 
αu+ αb: Alpha during bad 
financial times 
0.42 0.76 0.60 0.06 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.03 0.05 -0.32 2.00
(1.46) (2.25) (3.21) (0.39) (0.43) (0.95) (0.68) (0.18) (0.18) (-0.88) (5.07) 
            
Drawdowns:                  
αu: Good times alpha 0.19 0.42 0.17 0.24 0.58 0.59 0.71 0.14 0.36 0.38 0.75
(t) (1.36) (2.57) (1.85) (3.17) (3.89) (3.39) (3.60) (1.56) (2.46) (2.38) (3.90) 
αb: Bad times dummy 0.12 0.03 0.45 -0.12 -0.19 0.04 0.11 -0.20 -0.19 -0.31 0.59 
(t) (0.39) (0.09) (2.27) (-0.71) (-0.58) (0.10) (0.27) (-1.07) (-0.60) (-0.87) (1.42) 
αu+ αb: Alpha during 
drawdowns 
0.31 0.45 0.61 0.13 0.40 0.63 0.82 -0.06 0.17 0.08 1.35
(1.21) (1.51) (3.70) (0.90) (1.45) (1.97) (2.28) -(0.40) (0.64) (0.26) (3.83) 
            
Intersection of all bad times measures:              
αu: Good times alpha 0.17 0.39 0.27 0.27 0.63 0.67 0.74 0.10 0.39 0.43 0.75
(t) (1.38) (2.61) (3.26) (3.97) (4.65) (4.24) (4.13) (1.31) (2.94) (2.99) (4.28) 
αb: Bad times dummy 0.37 0.34 0.07 -0.52 -0.81 -0.61 -0.02 -0.14 -0.66 -1.18 1.26
(t) (0.94) (0.74) (0.27) (-2.41) (-1.91) (-1.24) (-0.04) (-0.59) (-1.58) (-2.48) (2.32) 
αu+ αb: Alpha during the 
intersection of all bad times 
measures 
0.54 0.73 0.34 -0.24 -0.17 0.06 0.71 -0.04 -0.26 -0.75 2.02
(1.49) (1.69) (1.41) (-1.21) (-0.44) (0.13) (1.38)  (-0.18) (-0.68) (-1.68) (3.99) 
                          
 
